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THE LOSING ARGUMENT
CONTINUES FOR PREVAILING
WITHOUT WINNING:
A CRITICAL SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT OF
BUCKHANNON ON THE CATALYST THEORY
INTRODUCTION
Winning isn't everything - it's the only thing. To the victor
go the spoils. The scoreboard has the final word. The clichds are
as true in the courtroom as they are on the field: litigation is often
a winner-take-all enterprise. But who is the victor when the game
stops short of victory? In sports, after a delay, cancellation, or tie,
each team leaves the field unaffected, and the crown of laurels
graces no brow. In the legal world, however, proponents of the
catalyst theory refuse to allow the laurels to gather dust. The cata-
lyst theory turns the concept of winning on its head by crowning
plaintiffs as "prevailing parties" without an official pronouncement
to legitimize the victory.
The American Rule states that "litigants generally pay their
own attorney fees win, lose, or draw, unless a statute provides oth-
erwise."' In spite of this tradition, the catalyst theory allows a
plaintiff to recover attorney fees from a defendant when the case is
settled or otherwise terminated before the court makes a final
judgment on the merits, even if the applicable fee-shifting statute
does not specifically provide for such a recovery. The theory is
centered around the notion that even if the court does not make a
final ruling, if the plaintiff essentially gets what it wanted, it
should be considered to have prevailed, and thus should be eligible
under the applicable statute to have its fees shifted to the defen-
dants. The key to bringing a plaintiff under the auspices of the
I Kerkhof v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 74, 74-75 (D. Me. 2002); see also
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980) ("[The usual rule in this country [is] that each
party is to bear the expense of his own attorney.").
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catalyst theory is a change in the defendant's behavior as a result
of the plaintiff's suit that gives the plaintiff some of the relief
sought in the suit. The theory is so named because the plaintiff's
suit is considered to be the "catalyst" that brought about the favor-
able change in the defendant's actions.2
Until recently, the catalyst theory was alive and well across
most of the federal circuits. However, in Buckhannon Board &
Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Hu-
man Resources3 the Supreme Court rejected the catalyst theory in
the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 4 and
the Fair Housing Administration Act ("FHAA"). 5 Unfortunately,
the catalyst theory has not faded quietly off into the sunset; in the
short time since Buckhannon theoretically banished the theory
from the legal landscape, the circuits have struggled to interpret
the Supreme Court's mandate, with some courts carving out excep-
tions that resurrect the theory in some interesting forms.6
Part I of this Note will summarize the state of the catalyst the-
ory in the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court leading up
to Buckhannon. Part II will examine the Buckhannon case itself,
while Part III will suggest a proper interpretation of its holding:
unless the relevant statutory fee-shift language explicitly provides
that a mere change in a defendant's behavior is a sufficient basis
for awarding attorney fees to a plaintiff, Buckhannon's rejection of
the catalyst theory applies to all actions brought under fee-shifting
statutes, regardless of whether the term "prevailing party" is used
in the fee-shift provision. In order for a party to be considered
"prevailing," the court must grant sanctioned relief through a fa-
vorable final judgment on the merits of the claim or through a con-
sent decree. Procedural or preliminary victories are insufficient to
confer prevailing party status, and a "functional equivalent" of a
consent decree can do so only if it contains the court's endorse-
ment of the terms of the settlement agreement and an explicit res-
2 The "catalyst" moniker carries with it the requirement that the defendant's change of
behavior must have been a result of the plaintiff's suit. See Goodell v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 207
F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that the catalyst theory does not apply be-
cause defendant changed its conduct before the plaintiff's suit was brought).
3 532 U.S. 598,610(2001).
4 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
5 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988).
6 Until recently, the Sixth Circuit was the only circuit not to have published any decisions
concerning Buckhannon and the catalyst theory. However, in a recent decision, the Sixth Cir-
cuit modified its definition of "prevailing party" to include aspects of the catalyst theory.
Habich v. City of Dearborn, 331 F.3d 524, 534 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that "a party may 'pre-
vail' if it 'obtain[s] a change in the legal relationship of the parties that originated in a court
order or that had at least received judicial sanction,"' quoting Chambers v. Ohio Dep't of Hu-
man Servs., 273 F.3d 690, 691 (6th Cir. 2001)).
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ervation of the court's jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. Also
included in this section will be a critical commentary on catalyst
cases since Buckhannon. Part IV will canvas the policy arguments
in favor of the suggested approach.
I. THE STATE OF CATALYST THEORY BEFORE BUCKHANNON
A. The Circuit Cases
In the vast majority of circuits, the catalyst theory was ac-
cepted in some form.7 In practice, the theory took on a variety of
shapes, the parameters of which were defined largely by the way in
which the court defined "prevailing party." The definition of the
term is of great significance to the operation of the catalyst theory
because the broader the class of activities that allow a party to be
considered "prevailing," the easier it is for that party to have its
fees shifted.
Some courts adopted a broad reading of the term, holding that
a prevailing party is one whose "ends are accomplished as a result
of the litigation, 8 allowing a party to prevail "in a practical
sense" 9 as long as it obtained "some of the benefit.., sought" by
the lawsuit.'0 Under such a broad interpretation, a plaintiff's relief
might come in the form of a formal court order, or more informally
in the shape of a private settlement or even by a mere change in a
defendant's behavior.
More exacting definitions of "prevailing party" required the
identification of a clear nexus between the plaintiff's suit and the
defendant's change in behavior; a plaintiff would be required to
establish that its suit was a "substantial" or "significant" cause of
the defendant's provision of relief." Courts adopting this stricter
definition scrutinized the strength of the plaintiffs case, requiring
7 Stanton v. S. Berkshire Reg'l Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 574, 577 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999); Morris
v. W. Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 1999); Payne v. Bd. of Educ., 88 F.3d 392,
397 (6th Cir. 1996); Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1995); Kilgour v. City of
Pasedena, 53 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995); Hooper v. Demco, Inc., 37 F.3d 287, 293 (7th
Cir. 1994); Zinn v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1994); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951-
52 (10th Cir. 1994); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 546-50 (3d Cir.
1994); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Sch. Dist. #1, 17 F.3d 260, 263 n.2 (8th Cir.
1994); Wheeler v. Towanda Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1991); Assoc. Builders
& Contractors v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1990); Grano v. Berry,
783 F.2d 1104, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Williams v. Leatherberry, 672 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir.
1982); Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1982).
8 Assoc. Builders & Contractors, 919 F.2d at 378.
9 Stewart, 675 F.2d at 85 1.
10 Wheeler, 950 F.2d at 131; see also Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.
Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 627 (2001).
1 Williams, 672 F.2d at 55 1.
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that the defendant's incentive to settle be based on "threat of vic-
tory," not "by dint of nuisance and threat of expense."' 2 Although
these courts allowed that "[v]ictory can be achieved well short of a
final judgment (or its equivalent),"'' 3 the plaintiff's suit "must have
prompted the defendant . . . to act or cease its behavior based on
the strength of the case, not 'wholly gratuitously' in response to
the plaintiff's claims."' 4  The level of strength required of the
plaintiff's case was not subject to a clear standard, but rather was
required to be "colorable" and not "frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless."' 5
However, approval of the catalyst theory was not universal
before Buckhannon. The Federal Circuit had not yet addressed the
issue, and the Fourth Circuit soundly repudiated its initial accep-
tance of the theory in S-1 and S-2 v. State Board of Education.16
The en banc court in that case held that the term "prevailing party"
was reserved for those that have "obtained an enforceable judg-
ment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the legal relief
sought."' 7  This circuit's treatment of the theory is especially
noteworthy, as it came in reaction to the Supreme Court's decision
in Farrar v. Hobby 8 and this was the circuit in which Buckhannon
was initially brought.
B. The Supreme Court Cases
Until its decision in Buckhannon, the Supreme Court's rela-
tionship with the catalyst theory was ambivalent at best. In Han-
rahan v. Hampton, 9 the Court reviewed the legislative history of
the principal federal fee-shifting statute, the Civil Rights Attorney
Fees Award Act ("CRAFAA"), 20 and found that "Congress in-
tended to permit the interim award of counsel fees only when a
12 Marbley, 57 F.3d at 234-35.
1- Id. at 234.
14 Hooper v. Demco, Inc., 37 F.3d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Burlington N.,
Inc., 832 F.2d 422, 425 (7th Cir. 1987)).
15 Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
'6 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc). See Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319
(4th Cir. 1979), for an early case in which the Fourth Circuit shifted attorney fees under the
catalyst theory.
'7 S-1, 21 F.3d at 51 (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992)). It is interesting to
note that under a post-Buckhannon regime, the Fourth Circuit's "rejection" of the catalyst theory
might actually allow for quite liberal fee shifting. The language in S-I indicates that private
settlements are enforceable mechanisms adequate to confer prevailing party status. If this lan-
guage does reject the catalyst theory, it certainly retains a broad reading of "prevailing party";
short of a defendant's voluntary change of behavior without any written agreement, a plaintiff
would still be considered to have "prevailed" and would be eligible to have its fees shifted.
18 506 U.S. 103 (1992).
19 446 U.S. 754 (1980).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
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party has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims.'
The Court also specified that such relief could be at the trial level
or on appeal. 22  However, no fees were awarded in this case be-
cause the appellate relief granted to the respondents was limited to
entitlement to a new trial, which did not constitute a ruling on the
merits of their claims. Although the grant of a new trial made rul-
ing on the merits of the respondents' claims possible, the court
found such a ruling not a matter "on which a party could 'prevail'
for purposes of shifting his counsel fees to the opposing party. 23
24In Maher v. Gagne, another action for fees brought under the
CRAFAA, the Court indicated that a settlement agreement en-
forced through a consent decree could be the basis for an attorney
fee award, even if it does not include an admission of liability by
the defendant. The plaintiff in that case was awarded fees because
she obtained virtually all of the relief she sought and "[tihe fact
that [she] prevailed through a settlement rather than through litiga-
tion [did] not weaken her claim to fees. 25 Later Court opinions
characterized the holding in Maher as supporting the award of at-
torney fees for certain private settlements.26
The Court's checkered treatment of the catalyst theory under
the CRAFAA continued with Hewitt v. Helms.27 On one hand, the
Court pronounced that it was "settled law" that a plaintiff could
prevail without a formal favorable judgment if the lawsuit prompts
the defendant's "voluntary action ... that redresses the plaintiff's
grievances. 28 Nevertheless, it held that "respect for ordinary lan-
guage requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the
merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail. 29 The ques-
tion of how much relief is required was expressly reserved, 30 but
21 Hanrahan, 446 U.S. at 758.
22 Id. at 757.
23 Id. at 759.
24 448 U.S. 122, 126 n.8 (1980) (noting that the consent decree specifically avoided ruling
on admission of fault).
25 Id. at 129.
26 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755,760 (1987).
But see Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 720 (1986) (reading Maher to hold only "that fees may
be assessed.., after a case has been settled by the entry of a consent decree"). When the major-
ity in Buckhannon addressed this issue, it indicated that a private settlement could only confer
prevailing party status when accompanied by a consent decree. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home,
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 n.7 ("Private settlements do
not entail the judicial approval and oversight involved in consent decrees.").
27 482 U.S. 755 (1987).
28 Id. at 760-61.
29 Id. at 760.
0 Id. at 763. In his concurring opinion in Buckhannon, Justice Scalia posits that Hewitt is
the source of the circuits' (mistaken) acceptance of the catalyst theory. Buckhannon, 532 U.S.
at 621. But the dissent in Buckhannon cites cases predating Hewitt that adopt the catalyst theory
from all circuits except the Federal Circuit. Id. at 626 n.4.
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no fees were awarded in that case because the party seeking fees
received no relief from the opposing party, only a favorable inter-
locutory ruling by the appellate court that his constitutional rights
• 31
had been violated. Without a court order granting or ordering
relief such as an award of damages, injunction or declaratory
judgment, consent decree or settlement, the court was unwilling to
confer prevailing party status.32
The issue of what constitutes prevailing party status was ad-
dressed again by the Court in Texas State Teacher Association v.
Garland Independent School District,33 which featured a three-part
test to determine such status.34 The first prong required that the
plaintiff obtain relief on a significant claim in the case and the
second prong mandated that the relief affect a material alteration in
the legal relationship between the parties. Finally, the change in
the relationship could not be merely technical or de minimis. Fol-
lowing this test, the court approved a fee-shift even though the
plaintiffs did not prevail on the central issue in the case because
they did obtain relief on some of their other claims. However, the
Court remanded the determination of the exact amount of the fee
award, which was to be reduced to reflect the amount spent litigat-
ing only those claims on which the plaintiffs prevailed.
The most problematic Supreme Court case addressing catalyst
theory was Farrar v. Hobby.35 Although its validity as a precedent
in catalyst theory jurisprudence is undercut by the fact that the
claim "involved no catalytic effect,, 36 nevertheless the dicta in
which the Court expressed its disapproval 37 was the basis for the
Fourth Circuit's rejection of the catalyst theory. 38 The Court's dis-
cussion in Farrar also indicated that even an award of nominal
damages by a court is enough to allow a plaintiff to be deemed a
"prevailing party," but the status itself does not make the award of
attorney fees appropriate in all cases, as the decisions whether to
31 Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760. The Court justified the distinction by explaining that
"[r]edress is sought through the court, but from the defendant." Id. at 761.
32 Id. at 760. Even if the judgment ultimately results in a favorable change in behavior,
the party seeking fees must personally benefit from the relief afforded by such change. See
Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (holding that changes in prison policy, even if caused
by plaintiffs suit, did not entitle plaintiff to a fee shift because he was released from prison long
before the new policy took effect).
33 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989).
34 Id. at 792.
35 506 U.S. 103 (1992).
36 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 194 (2000). Both the
majority and the dissent in Buckhannon recognize this distinction. Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Heath and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604,627 (2001).
37 Farrar, 506 U.S. at I I1-13.
38 S-I & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994).
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shift fees and in what amount are still within the judge's discretion
according to most fee-shifting statutes. 39 In fact, in the case before
it, the court found that no fee award was appropriate because the
plaintiff, seeking $17 million, was awarded a nominal one dollar in
damages for his civil rights claim. In light of his failure to prove
actual harm, an essential element of his damages claim, the court
concluded that the only appropriate fee award for such a "techni-
cal" victory would be no fee award at all.n° Shortly before its deci-
sion in Buckhannon, the Court once again expressly reserved a rul-
ing on the validity of the catalyst theory, and observed that the
question was still open.4'
II. BUCKHANNON: THE FACTS AND OPINIONS
A. The Facts
The case giving rise to the Court's direct consideration of the
catalyst theory began in West Virginia. The plaintiff Buckhannon,
an assisted living facility, had failed a state inspection by the West
Virginia Office of the State Fire Marshal after it was determined
that some residents of the home were incapable of "self-
preservation" in the event of an emergency, as required by state
law.4 2 In the face of an order to close the facility within thirty
days,43 Buckhannon brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of West Virginia on behalf of itself,
its residents, and other local boarding facilities against the State of
West Virginia, claiming that the state law requiring "self-
preservation" violated the FHAA and the ADA. 44 However, the
plaintiff's case was mooted in 1998 when the West Virginia legis-
19 Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114-16.
4 Id.
41 Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 194.
42 State law required that all residents of homes such as Buckhannon be capable of "self-
preservation," or capable of moving themselves to avoid imminent danger. W. VA. CODE
§§ 16-5H-1, 16-5H-2 (1998); W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 14.07(1) (1995) (although the West Vir-
ginia legislature repealed this entire act in 2003, this repeal has no effect on the analysis of the
catalyst theory in this case).
43 This order was subsequently stayed pending resolution of the case. Buckhannon Bd. &
Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 601 (2001). The
fact that Buckhannon was allowed to continue operation as the litigation progressed might ex-
plain the fact that its claim for monetary damages was dropped on January 2, 1998, leaving only
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 601 n.l. The lack of monetary damages
would later come back to haunt Buckhannon in its quest for attorney fees; if it had successfully
been able to claim damages, its suit would not have been completely mooted by the change in
the law, and it would have had independent grounds on which to seek a fee award. Id. at 608-
09.
44 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 19 F.
Supp. 2d 567, 570 (N.D. W. Va. 1998).
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lature amended both the statute 45 and its corresponding regula-
tions,46 and the case was dismissed.
47
Buckhannon requested that its attorney fees be shifted to the
defendant State under the fee-shifting provisions of the FHAA
48
and the ADA. 49 Both of these statutes provide that the court has
discretion to award attorney fees to a "prevailing party." Although
it had not received a favorable ruling and thus had not "prevailed"
in that sense, Buckhannon argued that its suit was the reason why
the State had voluntarily changed its law, and that the change
granted Buckhannon what it had been seeking in its suit. There-
fore, under the catalyst theory, Buckhannon argued that it was in-
deed a "prevailing party" and eligible for a fee shift. The District
Court, following Fourth Circuit precedent that rejected the catalyst
theory, denied Buckhannon's motion for attorney fees, and the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's deci-
sion in an unpublished, per curiam opinion. 50 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on September 26, 2000.
51
B. The Majority Opinion
The majority in Buckhannon found no ambiguity in the mean-
ing of the term "prevailing party," turning to Black's Law Diction-
ary to define such a party as one "'in whose favor a judgment is
rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded <in certain
cases, the court will award attorney's fees to the prevailing
party>. -- Also termed successful party."'52 From this language,
the court emphasized that prevailing party status centers on some
type of court-awarded relief.
53
In deciding the issue, the majority admitted that the Court's
prior decisions contained language that could justify both accep-
tance and rejection of the catalyst theory, but explained that, as it
had never had specific occasion to interpret the term "prevailing
party" in light of the catalyst theory, it was not bound by any of
43 1998 W. Va. Acts 1198-1199 (1998).
46 1998 W. Va. Acts 983-986 (1998).
47 At this point, the Buckhannon litigation had entered the discovery phase. Buckhannon,
532 U.S. at 601.
48 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (1988).
49 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1990).
50 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 203
F.3d 819 (4th Cir. 2000).
5' Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 530
U.S. 1304 (2000).
52 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7th ed.
1999)).
53 Id.
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this conflicting language.54 To decide whether the term allowed
for an award of attorney fees in catalyst situations, the court turned
to the legislative history of the CRAFAA, finding no clear Con-
gressional intent to shift fees in catalyst situations that would jus-
tify overturning the American Rule.55 Applying this interpretation
to the facts before it, the court found that no shifting of attorney
fees would be appropriate under the similar provisions in the ADA
and the FHAA. The upsetting of circuit jurisprudence was justi-
fied on the grounds that the lower court decisions had been par-
tially based on confusing and contradictory Supreme Court dicta
and that the Buckhannon decision simply set the issue straight.56
Justice Scalia joined the majority and also authored a separate
concurring opinion to rebut the arguments of the dissent in more
detail.57
It is also important to note that the rationale of Buckhannon,
and indeed most catalyst cases, does not apply to the situation in
which the plaintiff is seeking only court costs and not attorney
fees. The majority in Buckhannon expressly differentiates be-
tween costs and attorney fees: costs are awardable at a court's dis-
cretion and according to local rules. No judicial relief is needed to
justify an award of costs.58
C. The Dissenting Opinion
The four-justice minority found the definition of "prevailing
party" a bit more elusive. In fact, the clearer definition to the four
dissenting justices was one that incorporated the catalyst theory. 59
In contrast to the majority's formulation of the definition which
stressed its status as a legal term of art, the minority instead turned
to Webster's Dictionary for a more "everyday" definition of "pre-
vailing party" that would allow "a favorable alteration of actual
circumstances" without a "formal declaration" to confer status.6°
This definition would center on the reality of the plaintiff gaining
"the practical relief sought in her complaint." 6' To bolster its
.u Id.
55 Id. at 607.
6 Id. at 605 (stating that the legitimacy of the catalyst theory was "squarely presented"
and thus required reconciliation).
17 Id. at 610.
58 Id. at 606 n.8. Compare Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
257 (1975) (supporting the distinction), with Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, I ll U.S.
379, 388 (1884) (incorporating "figurative" use of the term "prevailing party" only to allow the
court to correct obvious injustice of legal maneuvering).
59 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 628-29 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that a court need not
refer to Black's Law Dictionary to find "preclusive" definitions of ambiguous statutory terms).
60 Id. at 633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
61 Id.
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characterization of the term as one with a broad functional mean-
ing, the dissent relied and built upon, inter alia, the definition used
in the Seventh Circuit case Stewart v. Hannon,62 in which the
proper inquiry was whether a plaintiff was redressed-in-fact by the
defendant's change in conduct.6 3 The dissent also approved of the
Court's own historical statement that prevailing can occur in the
"true and proper sense" if not formally.
64
In support of this broader definition, the dissent also pointed
out that catalyst plaintiffs are considered prevailing for tax pur-
poses, and that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides for
the default award of costs to the prevailing party,65 apparently re-
jecting the majority's distinction between costs and attorney's
fees. Moreover, the dissent argued, catalyst theory is not inconsis-
tent with a stricter definition such as the majority's that centers
around the alteration of the legal relationship of the parties, be-
cause the legal relationship between parties does change when a
defendant ceases the behavior to which the plaintiff objects and the
suit is accordingly dismissed.66 Most importantly to the dissent, a
more expansive, practical definition of "prevailing party" is more
consistent with the goal of fee-shifting mechanisms: "'to promote
the vigorous enforcement' of civil rights. 67
III. PROPER INTERPRETATION OF BUCKHANNON'S HOLDING
A. To What Statutes Does Buckhannon Apply?
A proper interpretation of Buckhannon does not limit its ap-
plication to the statutes involved in that case or even to only those
fee-shifting provisions that use the term "prevailing party." The
rationale of the majority opinion relies on broad underlying policy
that applies stably across all fee-shifting statues.
1. Is the Ruling Limited to the Statutes Involved in Buckhannon?
In framing the issue at the beginning of its opinion, the major-
ity pointed out that "numerous" federal statutes allow for fee-
shifting and that it had granted certiorari "[t]o resolve the dis-
agreement amongst the Courts of Appeals" regarding catalyst the-
62 675 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1982).
63 Id. at 851 (focusing on whether the defendant's change "provide[s], in substantial part,
the relief sought").
64 Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 11I U.S. 379, 388 (1884).
65 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 631-32 9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412,422 (1978)).
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68
ory. In the discussion of prior circuit cases, the Court noted that
those cases that adopted the catalyst theory arose under a variety
of statutes, not just the ADA and the FHAA involved in Buckhan-
non.6 9 The reference to these cases implies that the Court meant to
adopt a general rule rejecting the theory under all fee-shifting
mechanisms. More explicitly, the majority opinion actually listed
other federal statutes involving fee-shifting provisions and ex-
plained that it is the Court's preference to "interpre[t] these fee-
shifting provisions consistently. 7 °  Even Buckhannon's dissent
implicitly recognized that the decision was not limited to the stat-
utes involved in that case when it cited the legislative history of
the CRAFAA (which was not involved in Buckhannon) to support
its broad interpretation of the term "prevailing party," and explic-
itly when it observed the consistent treatment that such statutes
have received when interpreted by the Court.7'
Aside from the language of the opinion itself, the fact that the
term "prevailing party" is a legal term of art is instructive. The
purpose of adopting terms of art is to express the same concept
consistently in numerous statutes. This purpose is reflected in the
established judicial practice of presuming that when Congress uses
a legal term of art, it intends for the term to take on its established
legal meaning.72 It is generally accepted, even in courts that are
neutral or friendly to the catalyst concept, that Buckhannon's in-
terpretation of "prevailing party" applies consistently to various
statutes using the term.73
68 Id. at 602.
69 id. at 603-04.
70 Id. at 603 n.4. For another statement of the Court's proclivity for interpreting fee-
shifting mechanisms consistently, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
71 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 624.
72 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) ("[Wlhere Congress borrows
terms of art... it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word .... In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction
with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them."); Union of Needletrades, Indus.
& Textile Employees v. United States INS, 202 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (positing
that legal terms of art such as "prevailing party" "must be read in accordance with their legal
connotation").
73 For example, Buckhannon has been readily applied to cases arising under the Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act. See Maddalino v. Principi, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9698, at *4 (Fed. Cir.
May 17, 2002) (unpublished); Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 288 F.3d 1371,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Hudson v. Principi, 260 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For an appli-
cation of Buckhannon to the National Voter Registration Act, see Nat'l Coalition for Students
with Disabilities v. Bush, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276 (N.D. Fla. 2001). See generally Bennett
v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2001) ("There can be no doubt that the Court's analy-
sis in Buckhannon applies to statutes other than the two at issue in that case."); Envtl. Prot. Info.
Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17909, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2002)
("Admittedly, Buckhannon is not limited to the FHAA and ADA."). One court went so far as to
find that the word "prevailing" was a legal term of art even when used alone, and thus inter-
preted a statute using the term "substantially prevails" in accord with "prevailing party." Union
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Nevertheless, a string of post-Buckhannon cases have at-
tempted to exempt the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA") 74 from Buckhannon's reach, even though that statute
uses the "prevailing party" term in its fee-shifting provision.75 The
differentiation is asserted to be based on the policies underlying
the statute.76 The argument goes that parents challenging a school
system's alleged violation of their child's rights have a particular
need for legal representation to help them navigate the IDEA's
detailed procedures. Statutory language granting parents the "right
to be accompanied and advised by counsel and by individuals with
special knowledge or training with respect to the problems of chil-
dren with disabilities, 77 is purported to demonstrate congressional
intent to fulfill this special need for counsel. This line of reason-
ing concludes that because of the prohibitive cost of counsel, deny-
ing these parents the possibility of having their attorney fees paid
for in the event of settlement would "place parents in the con-
flicted position of choosing between legal representation and their
child's interests in expeditious settlement.
78
First of all, it is a non sequitur to say that the statutory lan-
guage cited by these courts as evidence of Congress' purpose to
"assist parents in obtaining legal representation" 79 even implicates
the issue of fee shifting. It may be permissible to interpret these
words as allowing parents the right to involve attorneys and ex-
perts in the IDEA process, but it is quite a leap from the plain lan-
guage of the statute to infer an additional right to have that counsel
paid for by the opposing party in the event of settlement. More
importantly, even if Congress intended such a purpose, it could not
be interpreted from the legal term of art it chose to use in the sec-
tion that does directly address fee shifting. Although it is an estab-
of Needletrades, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
7 20 U.S.C. § 1400(2000).
75 Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
76 See, e.g., Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45-46 (D.D.C. 2002) (dif-
ferentiating the IDEA). Other district-level courts in the District of Columbia have not been so
bold as to defy Buckhannon, but instead merely state the case for differentiation of the IDEA
and express the wish that precedent would allow the court to do so. See Alegria v. Dist. of
Columbia, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16898, at *5-*6 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2002) (emphasizing the
IDEA's unique social goals and process, but applying Buckhannon reluctantly due to lack of
precedent to differentiate); Akinseye v. Dist. of Columbia, 193 F. Supp. 2d 134, 136-40 (D.D.C.
2002) (applying Buckhannon to IDEA because of lack of precedent to differentiate it, but noting
conflicting policy concerns); John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18254, at *14-*16 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2001) (rejecting attempt to distinguish the IDEA from Buck-
hannon based on incentives for settling); see also J.C. v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 10, 278 F.3d 119 (2d
Cir. 2002) (applying Buckhannon to the IDEA).
77 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(1).
78 Johnson, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
79 Id.
[Vol. 54:2
THE LOSING ARGUMENT
lished canon to interpret statutory language according to the under-
lying purposes of the statute,80 a variable interpretation does not
apply to standardized legal terms of art such as "prevailing party."
If Congress wanted the IDEA to execute a policy by operating in a
way that is not contemplated by the customary interpretation of
"prevailing party," it presumably would not have deliberately used
the term of art in the statute, but instead would have chosen an-
other word that would better effectuate that policy. 81
2. Is the Ruling Limited to Statutes that use the Term "Prevailing
Party"?
Buckhannon's rationale encompasses more than mere statu-
tory interpretation, and is not confined to statutes that use the
"prevailing party" term. As one court put it, "the broader import
of [the Buckhannon] ruling is not limited to the term 'prevailing
party.' ' '82  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a fee-shifting mecha-
nism that does not rely in some measure on the notion that the
party to whom fees are to be shifted must be the prevailing party.
As noted and supported above, fee-shifting statutes are to be inter-
preted consistently due to the common purpose underlying them.83
The prevailing party concept is so integral to the idea of fee shift-
ing that it is the post-Buckhannon practice of several circuits to
read the "prevailing party" term into fee-shifting statutes that do
not explicitly use it.84 The policy and purpose of fee shifting apply
regardless of the specific wording of statutes. To limit application
of Buckhannon's rejection of the catalyst theory based merely on
the absence of the "prevailing party" term contorts the meaning
and frustrates the intent of fee-shifting mechanisms in general.85
80 Id. (noting that individual provisions must be read in the context of the entire statute to
effect the statute's underlying purpose).
81 See Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees v. United States INS, 202 F.
Supp. 2d 265, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that every choice of words in a statute is purpose-
ful). Indeed, this argument underscores that interpreting fee-shifting mechanisms consistently is
not, as the Buckhannon dissent claims, hostile to the purpose of encouraging civil rights cases to
be brought. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Heath and Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 640 (2001). On the contrary, it merely incorporates the default assumption
of the American Rule into statutory interpretation: If the statute does not clearly indicate that the
plaintiff might prevail by means other than those commonly associated with the term, it is as-
sumed that fee shifting is inappropriate in such a case. As with all default rules, if this is not the
desired result, Congress can draft the statute accordingly.
12 Bublitz v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1239 (S.D. Iowa
2002).
83 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
84 For examples of courts inferring the prevailing party term into the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000), see Bublitz, 224 F. Supp.
2d at 1234; Kerkhof v. MCI WorldCom., Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. Me. 2002).
85 See Aboidun v. McElroy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3519, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2002)
(holding that Buckhannon "leaves no doubt at all that it governs the interpretation" of a large
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Most courts have applied Buckhannon wherever fee shifting
was at issue in the case with little regard for use of the "prevailing
party" term.86 However, a recent string of cases in the Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have refused to apply Buckhannon to
actions for attorney fees arising under the Endangered Species Act
("ESA") 87 because the statute does not use the term "prevailing
party" in its fee-shifting provision.88 These courts find the ESA's
allowance of a fee shift "whenever appropriate" is "distinguishable
on its face" from the "prevailing party" language used in most
other fee-shifting mechanisms. 89
Although the language of the ESA might differ slightly from
more conventional fee-shifting language, the concept and purpose
underlying the statute is still the same. The idea that it would ever
be "appropriate" to award attorney fees to a party that had not pre-
vailed is inconsistent with the very concept of fee shifting. Fortu-
nately, the differentiation of the ESA from Buckhannon appears to
be limited to a few courts, 90 although the differentiation recently
was approved at the appellate level in the Tenth and Eleventh Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals, and the issue is currently under review by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
B. What Does a Plaintiff Have to Do in Order to Prevail?
Buckhannon's death blow to the catalyst theory, though appli-
cable to all fee-shifting mechanisms, does not end the inquiry into
whether a defendant will be liable for a plaintiff's attorney fees
when the litigation stops short of final judgment. Consistent with
its earlier decisions, 9' the Buckhannon majority acknowledged that
based on the legislative history of the seminal fee-shifting statute
CRAFAA, a party could prevail short of a final judgment on the
number of similarly worded federal fee-shifting statutes).
86 See, e.g., Bublitz, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 1234 (applying Buckhannon to ERISA); Pitchford
v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 613, 616 (W.D. Va. 2002) (applying Buck-
hannon to Magnuson-Moss Act); Union of Needletrades, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (applying
Buckhannon to FOIA); C.L.U.B. v. City of Chi., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5913, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 28, 2002) (applying Buckhannon to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000); Johnny's Icehouse, Inc. v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11671,
at *7-*12 (N.D. l. Aug. 2, 2001) (applying Buckhannon to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)).
87 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000).
88 Id. § 1540(g)(4). For a case from each circuit differentiating the ESA, see Loggerhead
Turtle v. County Council, 307 F.3d 1318 (11 th Cir. 2002); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nor-
ton, 262 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 2001); S.W. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Carroll, 182 F. Supp.
2d 944 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (from the district level of the Ninth Circuit).
89 Southwest, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 947.
90 See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 993, 998 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (citing differing language in the ESA as making Buckhannon's rationale inapplicable).
9' See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760-61 (1987).
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merits of the case.92 Just how short of that final judgment the
plaintiff's level of relief can fall continues to be a major point of
contention in the circuits after Buckhannon. The plaintiff need not
obtain all of the relief sought in the suit in order to be considered
to have prevailed.93  Buckhannon specifically provides that a fa-
vorable judgment on the merits of the plaintiff's claim or a consent
decree that will enforce the terms of the settlement are sufficient to
allow for a plaintiff to be considered prevailing. 94 As a more gen-
eral guiding principle, Buckhannon held that what makes the relief
capable of conferring prevailing party status is the stamp of the
court's "imprimatur."95  The court must be involved in granting
relief in the case before it, or else it lacks sufficient power to
anoint either party as prevailing.96
1. What Type of Ruling is a Ruling on the Merits?
If a court ruling is to confer prevailing party status, the ruling
cannot be procedural, but rather must squarely address the merits
of the plaintiff's case. 97  For example, the Buckhannon majority
explicitly stated that an interlocutory ruling that reverses a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion98 or a directed verdict99
are insufficient to render a plaintiff a prevailing party. Subsequent
cases in lower courts have held that the fact that a plaintiff's sur-
92 Buckhannon v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 607 (2001).
93 Id. at 604 (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992)) (holding that even an award of
nominal damages might suffice); see also Nat'l Coalition for Students with Disabilities v. Bush,
173 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs need only gain a small
amount of the total relief sought). However, the plaintiff must make some change in the status
quo in order to be considered to have gained relief. Walker v. United States HUD, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17542 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2001). If the plaintiff does obtain less than all of the
relief it sought in the suit, the court may shift less than all of the plaintiffs attorney fees, in
proportion to the plaintiffs success. Muehe v. Sports Depot, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7382 (D.
Mass. Feb. 20, 2002) (awarding plaintiff fees only as to one claim because that claim was the
only one on which it received judgment).
94 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.
95 Id. at 605.
9 Allowing a plaintiff to be considered to "prevail" when the court has awarded no relief
exudes the same kind of judicial activism and disregard for faithful statutory interpretation that
led the court in Bandera v. City of Quincy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16685 (D. Mass. Aug. 29,
2002), to proclaim that once the "prevailing party" threshold is crossed, fee awards "are virtu-
ally obligatory," even though the statute at issue in that case, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000), uses permissive language in allowing that the judge
"may" award fees. Contra Bublitz v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1234,
1245 n.5 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (holding that there is "no longer even a presumption" that fee awards
should be granted under the permissive language of ERISA).
97 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605; see also Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 212
F. Supp. 2d 613 (W.D. Va. 2002) (finding that the order adjudicating an arbitration term that
does not address the merits of plaintiff's case is procedural, while the ruling that confers status
must be substantive).
98 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755,760 (1987)).
99 Id. (citing Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 754 (1980)).
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vival of a motion to dismissl °° or success with a preliminary in-
junction' °' will not justify a fee shift. There is some confusion as
to whether a temporary restraining order ("TRO") is a sufficiently
final ruling to confer prevailing party status, but at least one court
has found TROs to be inadequate.10 2 Most, but not all, courts have
recognized the procedural/substantive distinction and allowed for
fee shifts only after a substantive ruling on the merits.'0 3 Like-
wise, a successful motion that is later overturned cannot provide
the basis for prevailing party status.'
04
The Buckhannon dissent would relax the merit requirement
and allow for fee shifts in cases where the plaintiff's claim is
found to be merely "colorable" and not "groundless."' °5 This ap-
proach essentially abandons the merit requirement entirely by al-
lowing plaintiffs with non-meritorious claims that fall short of to-
tal absurdity to be considered "prevailing."' 1 6  Such an arrange-
"°JPitchford, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 618 (holding that surviving a motion to dismiss is not a
final ruling on which prevailing party status can be based).
101 Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that preliminary injunction is
not enough to confer status when it is not incorporated into an order of dismissal and no juris-
diction is retained); John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18254, at
*16-*17 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2001) (holding that a preliminary injunction cannot confer status
when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses). But see Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co.,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17909 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2002) (holding that a preliminary injunction
can confer status under statutes like the ESA and the Clean Water Act that have more permis-
sive fee-shifting language than statutes using the "prevailing party" term); Watson v. County of
Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cit. 2002) (providing Buckhannon's requirement of judi-
cial imprimatur is satisfied by a preliminary injunction).
"
12 The main controversy seems centered in the Seventh Circuit around Johnny's Ice
House, Inc. v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11671 (N.D. I11. Aug. 2,2001), in
which the court held that a TRO and defendant's voluntary dismissal alone are not enough to
confer prevailing party status. Nevertheless, such status was conferred under the facts of that
case because the court order "formaliz[ed] and memorialize[ed] [defendant's] commitment" to
alter its behavior, thereby subjecting it to "judicial oversight and enforcement," essentially re-
sulting in the functional equivalent of a consent decree. Id. at *10. This case has been errone-
ously relied upon for the proposition that a temporary retraining order alone is enough to confer
status. See Sileikis v. Perryman, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12737, at *8 (N.D. I11. Aug. 20, 2001)
(relying on Johnny's in equating a TRO to a "finding of fact by the court indicating wrongdo-
ing" that can form the basis for prevailing party status upon defendant's voluntary dismissal).
However, the controversy is not limited to the Seventh Circuit; at least one other circuit
has held that a TRO is sufficient to confer status. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co.,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17909 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2002) (finding that a TRO can confer status
when the "prevailing party" term is used in the statute).
103See, e.g., Sileikis, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12737 (holding that filing a complaint and
scheduling of a hearing do not sufficiently involve the court to justify conferring status). But
see Lynom v. Widnall, 222 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2002) (ruling that having the court remand
the case for board reconsideration is enough of a ruling on the merits to change the legal rela-
tionship of the parties).
I'm Fed'n of Adver. Indus. Representatives, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4051, at *5 (N.D.
I11. Mar. 14, 2002) (declining to find that the plaintiff had prevailed when its summary judgment
motion was overturned on appeal).
10-Buckhannon v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 627 (2001).
10Id. at 620 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he catalyst theory's purported 'merit test'...
is scant protection for the innocent.").
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ment leaves the defendant in the doubly unjust position of liability
for the plaintiff's attorney fees and for those it incurred itself while
defending the meritless claim. It also allows courts to sidestep
Buckhannon, as it is the same standard followed by pre-
Buckhannon courts in administering the catalyst theory. 10 7 Aside
from being too permissive, the "groundless" standard is too unde-
fined and inefficient to administer in a meaningful way, especially
if the plaintiff's claim has already been mooted. 0 8
2. If the Court Makes no Formal Ruling, what Other Forms of Relief
Sufficiently Involve the Court so as to Allow for Fee Shifting?
The most striking effect of Buckhannon's abandonment of the
catalyst theory is that a defendant's voluntary change in behavior
is no longer enough to confer prevailing party status, even if the
change in behavior is what the plaintiff was seeking in the lawsuit;
there must be a corresponding "judicially sanctioned change in the
legal relationship of the parties."' 1 9 If a defendant merely changes
its behavior voluntarily, until a consent decree is entered, the be-
havior remains just that - voluntary. The "favorable alteration of
actual circumstances,"'"10 as advocated by the dissent, is not a le-
gally binding act capable of altering either party's legal status be-
cause the defendant is in no way bound to continue providing the
plaintiff with relief. Although voluntary changes of behavior no
longer confer prevailing party status, post-Buckhannon lower
courts have embraced the idea that "prevailing" can occur short of
a formal ruling on the merits when the court issues a formal con-
sent decree, in which it adopts the terms of the parties' agreement
and retains jurisdiction to enforce it.'
Some courts, especially the District of Columbia and Ninth
Circuits, have seized upon the "alteration in the legal relationship"
language in the majority opinion to allow for fee shifting when the
07 See, e.g., Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (formulating a similar
standard).
"0 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 620 (Scalia, J., concurring).
1091d. at 605; see also Effertz v. Barton County, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (D. Kan.
2001) ("[Tlhe definition of 'prevailing party' does not include a party who achieves a desired
result through defendant's voluntary change.").
11 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 633.
"'1 See, e.g., Kossov v. Perryman, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7944, at *6 (N.D. II1. Apr. 30,
2002) (holding that no fees can be awarded under Equal Access to Justice Act when plaintiff
received neither judgment nor consent decree, which requires judicial review and oversight);
Alcocer v. United States INS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20543, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2001)
(denying fees in Equal Access to Justice Act claim because plaintiffs did not receive judgment
or settlement enforceable through a consent decree). The consent decree need not even contain
the defendant's admission of liability in order to be capable of conferring status. Christina A. v.
Bloomberg, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098-99 (D. S.D. 2001).
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relief to the plaintiff comes in the form of a private settlement with
the defendant."12  The settlement, usually a contract between the
plaintiff and the defendant, is the source of the alteration in the
legal relationship because it binds both parties with legal rights
and responsibilities, which allows for prevailing party status to be
conferred upon the plaintiff.
Relying solely on a private settlement to confer prevailing
party status is problematic because the relief and the corresponding
change in the legal relationship are not court-ordered." 3 This ap-
proach ignores the Buckhannon majority's requirement of judicial
imprimatur and closely resembles the catalyst theory in practice,
112 A large number of the cases holding that a private settlement can confer prevailing
party status involve the IDEA, so this argument might be limited to, or at least stronger for,
cases brought under that statute in light of its underlying purposes as discussed in section
1V(A)(I) of this Note. See K.R. v. Jefferson Township Bd. of Educ., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13267, at *16 (D. N.J. June 25, 2002) (holding that since an IDEA Notice Agreement is a le-
gally enforceable document, it is capable of conferring prevailing party status); Johnson v. Dist.
of Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2002) (relying on the goals of the IDEA to allow a
private settlement to confer status because it alters the legal relationship between the parties).
But see J.S. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 165 F. Supp. 2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that
parties entering into private settlements under the IDEA are not entitled to prevailing party
status).
Nevertheless, the cases from the Ninth Circuit have found settlements of claims brought
under other statutes to be a sufficient change in the legal relationship to confer prevailing party
status. One such opinion classified Buckhannon's rejection of the argument that private settle-
ments can confer prevailing party status as dicta, and chose rather to follow Circuit precedent to
allow for a fee shift. The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari when this decision was
appealed. Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that legally enforceable settlement of an ADA claim can make plaintiff a prevailing party be-
cause it forces the defendant to do something he would not otherwise be required to do), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 820 (2002); see also Richard S. v. Dep't of Developmental Servs., 2003 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1396, at *1 1-*12 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2003) (holding an ADA settlement to be proper
basis for fee shift); Carson v. Billings Police Dep't, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 11720, at *3-*4 (9th
Cir. June 12, 2002) (finding settlement capable of conferring prevailing party status under
CRAFAA); Ostby v. Oxnard Union High, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (concluding
that IDEA plaintiff was prevailing party because its settlement was legally enforceable in court).
13 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605; see also N.Y. State Fed'n of Taxi Drivers, Inc. v. West-
chester County Taxi, 272 F.3d 154, 158-59 (2d Cit. 2001) (applying Buckhannon in a CRAFAA
case to deny fee shift because the "lawsuit did not result in a judicially sanctioned change in the
legal relationship of the parties").
The inefficacy of the settlement as a means for conferring the court's stamp on the altera-
tion of the relationship between the parties is demonstrated by the manner in which the rights
conferred by a settlement differ from those resulting from a court-ordered judgment or decree.
In an effort to exercise the rights afforded it under a private contractual settlement, a plaintiff
would have to bring a private claim for breach of contract in an appropriate court, most likely
not even the one in which its original claim was filed. In contrast, enforcement of a judgment or
decree would not entail any of the interpretation necessary in the contract case because the
relevant document would be a product of the court. If the defendant were in violation of a court
order or judgment, enforcement of the order (which derives its legitimacy from the government-
sponsored court) would be more a matter of public concern to be handled by the state, rather
than a private contractual dispute. See Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 212 F. Supp.
2d 613 (W.D. Va. 2002) (holding that private settlement cannot confer status); Roberson v.
Guiliani, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2750, at *5-*7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2002) (requiring court in-
volvement in relief in order to activate fee shift), vacated, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2003).
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with the only difference being that the change in the defendant's
behavior must be commemorated in a document. Relief that
comes in the form of a contractual settlement derives its validity
from the parties to the case, not the court. As the relief becomes
more informal, the parties take control of the terms and implemen-
tation of the relief, and the court is not involved in evaluation or
enforcement based on the merits of the case. 114
To illustrate, the court's involvement in awarding relief to a
plaintiff in the context of a private settlement is limited to hearing
a case after the plaintiff files a separate and subsequent claim for
the defendant's breach of the contractual settlement. 15 There are a
few problems with basing an award of attorney fees on this level
of court involvement. First, the possibility of a future lawsuit is
too tenuous a hook upon which to hang prevailing party status.
Any court involvement at all in the relief is contingent on the de-
fendant breaching the terms of the settlement - a situation that
very well might never arise. Such prospective involvement in pos-
sible future scenarios is an inadequate basis for the award of fees
in the separate original case presently before the court.
Moreover, the timing of the court's involvement is also incon-
sistent with any power it might have to shift fees because the court
would lack the power to enforce the settlement on its own initia-
tive through its contempt power. 16 It must wait for a private ac-
tion to be brought by the plaintiff (which will probably be done in
another court) before any enforcement bearing the stamp of judi-
cial imprimatur can be affected. Until a court is called upon to
enforce the contract, any "relief" that the plaintiff enjoys is a result
of its own bargaining with the defendant, not the court's involve-
114 Indeed, the level of necessary judicial involvement in a private settlement is reflected in
the fact that the parties had the same power to enter into the agreement before the case was
brought before the court.
15The action would probably need to be pursued in another court entirely; if the terms of
the private settlement are not incorporated into a consent decree (or possibly an order of dis-
missal in some places), the subsequent settlement enforcement is a contract action that will have
to be filed in state rather than federal court. Roberson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2750, at *12-
*13.
116 See id. at *15-*16 (discussing lack of authority to find contempt after dismissal). The
process of enforcing a consent decree is quite different than that of a private settlement. To
enforce a consent decree, the plaintiff need only petition the court from which the order derived
to issue an order to the defendant "to show cause why [it] should not be adjudged in civil con-
tempt and sanctioned." Reynolds v. Roberts, 207 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11 th Cir. 2000). The burden
is thus on the defendant to prove it is not in breach. In contrast, a private contract action must
be brought by the plaintiff in state court (unless independent grounds for federal jurisdiction
exist). In this unrelated proceeding, the burden of interpreting the settlement and providing
evidence of breach will be on the plaintiff.
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ment in the shaping and enforcement of its terms.' " 7 As the district
court in Roberson v. Guiliani put it:
Although it may be minimal, there is a level of judicial scru-
tiny of the terms of a consent decree that is entirely absent
when a lawsuit is dismissed based on the parties' agreement
to settle it. When a district court is asked to approve a con-
sent decree, it must make at least a "minimal determination
of whether the agreement is appropriate to be accorded the
status of a judicially enforceable decree." '" 8
The importance of judicial involvement in the award of relief
is further demonstrated by the Supreme Court's statement that a
declaration that a defendant has violated the Constitution unac-
companied by "judicial relief' is not enough to confer prevailing
party status on a plaintiff."t 9 Unless Buckhannon overturned this
statement, of which the opinion gives no indication, 20 it would
appear that a change in the legal relationship alone, without any
specific court-ordered relief, is an insufficient basis for fee shift-
ing.12
1
Allowing a plaintiff to be considered to have prevailed after it
has settled is also troubling from a larger theoretical perspective.
'
17 This argument does not address the different treatment of class action settlements,
which are subject to mandatory review and approval by the court.
118Roberson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2750, at *9-* 10 (quoting United States v. IBM, 163
F.3d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1998)). The court goes on to describe the scrutiny that the court must
apply to the decree: "[iThe district court must be certain that the decree 1) 'spring[s] from and
serve[s] to resolve a dispute within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction,' 2) 'come[s] within
the general scope of the case made by the pleadings,' and 3) 'further[s] the objectives of the law
upon which the complaint was based."' Id. at *10 (quoting Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d
241,244 (2d Cir. 1989)).
Although the Roberson decision was vacated and remanded by the Second Circuit on Sep-
tember 30, 2003, see Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2003), the requirement of court
oversight of the settlement terms remained intact. The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs in
that case had prevailed based on the court's retention of jurisdiction to enforce the settlement,
and did not require that the terms of the settlement be explicitly enumerated in the order of
dismissal. However, in so holding, the Second Circuit did not abandon the requirement that the
court approve and adopt the settlement terms through its order: "[B]ecause the court has the
general responsibility to ensure that its orders are fair and lawful, it retains some responsibility
over the terms of the settlement agreement as the parties' obligation to comply with the agree-
ment was made part of its order." Id. at 82. Therefore, the Second Circuit did not dispute the
need for court oversight of settlement terms, but rather merely took issue with the form that the
oversight should take. Whereas the district court would have required the court to enumerate
the terms of the settlement in its order, the Second Circuit found that incorporation of the set-
tlement order by reference was sufficient evidence of court oversight.
"
9 Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987) (explaining the requirement of judicial re-
lief before plaintiff can be said to prevail).
120 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 603-04 (2001) (referring to Hewitt).
121 See Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc., 261 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a finding that
defendant's behavior was illegal is insufficient to confer prevailing party status if the plaintiff
does not receive judgment or damages due to a recognized injury).
[Vol. 54:2
THE LOSING ARGUMENT
A settlement is an agreement that is acceptable to both sides; oth-
erwise, the parties would not enter into it. In that sense at least,
each side can be said to have prevailed in that its "ends are accom-
plished as a result of the litigation."'' 22 In a more practical sense,
such a rule would require a time-consuming and ultimately subjec-
tive inquiry into the merits of the plaintiff's claim and why each
party decided to settle. Did the settlement occur because the plain-
tiff's case was likely to win at trial or because the suit would sim-
ply be too much of a nuisance to litigate? 123  This ultimately in-
conclusive line of questioning into the intent of the parties is an
unsound and unjust basis for shifting fees and might even violate a
defendant's right to a trial by jury, as determinations of intent are
traditionally the province of the jury, and the court has sole discre-
tion in fee-shift determinations. 124  At the very least, a court-
conducted assessment of the merits of the plaintiff's case for a fee-
shift determination is a waste of resources as it necessitates an in-
efficient mini-trial, or "second major litigation,"' 125 on attorney
fees.
3. Will the "Functional Equivalent" of a Consent Decree Confer
Prevailing Party Status?
Some courts have allowed an order of dismissal into which
the terms of the parties' private settlement are incorporated to
function as a consent decree and thus confer prevailing party
status. 26 Although the Buckhannon majority opinion indicates in
122See Assoc. Builders & Contractors v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 378 (5th
Cir. 1990) (defining "prevailing party").
123 See Hooper v. Demco, 37 F.3d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that the reasons
parties settle may be "wholly unrelated to the substance and issues involved in the litigation," in
that "[a] suit may be groundless, and settled for its nuisance value, or settled by a party for
wholly gratuitous reasons, thus not justifying an award of attorney's fees").
124The concern of fee-shift determinations not being heard before a jury is probably un-
dercut by the fact that the rights granted under the fee-shifting provision of a statute are argua-
bly more akin to an equitable rather than a legal claim, and therefore not connected to the trial
by jury guarantee. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 612, 632 n.8 (discussing discretion of equity
courts in awarding costs). The argument for requiring fee-shift claims to be heard before a jury
would also have to overcome Supreme Court precedent distinguishing "public rights" created by
statute from "private rights" arising from common law. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51
(1932), and its progeny suggest that only the latter are entitled to a trial by jury. Moreover, even
if the statutory origin of fee-shifting claims is not dispositive, there is additional Court precedent
allowing for common law claims that are ancillary to disputes within an agency's jurisdiction to
be resolved by the agency, signifying that the right to a jury trial is not absolute even as to
common law claims. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841
(1986) (allowing common law counterclaims to be resolved by CFTC).
'
25 Bublitz v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1240 (S.D. Iowa
2002) (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609-10).
126See, e.g., Reed v. Shenandoah Mem. Hosp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14867, at *10 (D.
Neb. Aug. 12, 2002) ("[T]he functional equivalent of a consent decree... provid[es] the neces-
sary judicial imprimatur on the change in conduct."); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 2001 U.S. Dist.
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dicta that the "functional equivalent" of a consent decree might
confer prevailing party status,127 some courts have been cautious in
conferring status in such cases.
28
The distinction between a private settlement thus incorporated
and a consent decree is warranted for reasons similar to those dis-
cussed above in the context of other types of private settlements.
The court is not involved in adjudication or formulation of settle-
ment terms, whereas a consent decree's terms are judicially sanc-
tioned because they are "so-ordered by the court."'129  The settle-
ment terms are a product of the parties, not the court, and thus lack
the necessary judicial imprimatur.'30  By its very definition, a con-
sent decree is distinct from a private settlement; even if the court
plays no role in the negotiation of the terms in the consent decree,
in issuing the formal order that releases the case subject to the
terms stated in the order, the court adopts the terms as its own and
agrees to enforce them.
This mark of approval, emphasized by the court's agreement
to enforce the terms through the jurisdiction retained by the con-
sent decree, supplies the brand of judicial imprimatur that makes
fee shifting appropriate. The importance of the court's formal ex-
pression of its approval of the terms of the settlement is reflected
by the fact that some courts that do recognize functional equiva-
lents of consent decrees do so only if the court actively incorpo-
rates the settlement terms into the order, as opposed to merely stat-
ing that the judgment was "entered in accordance with" the settle-
ment agreement'13 or referencing the agreement or otherwise men-
tioning the fact of settlement in the court record.
32
LEXIS 22438, at *18-*19 (D. R.I. Oct. 18, 2001) (conferring prevailing party status on the basis
of a functional equivalent); Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 (D. S.D.
2001) (holding that a reading of Buckhannon that requires a formal consent decree is too nar-
row), rev'd, 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. 2003).
127 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n.7, 608 n.9.
128 See, e.g., Roberson v. Guiliani, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2750, at *8-*9 (S.D.N.Y Feb.
21, 2002) (discussing requirements for prevailing party status), vacated, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.
2003).
129 Id. at *14.
130 Even though a consent decree does not always contain the defendant's admission of li-
ability, it deserves distinction for its capability to confer prevailing party status because the
change it effects in the relationship between the parties is court-ordered. Buckhannon, 532 U.S.
at 604; see also Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 126 n.8 (1980) (recognizing that consent de-
crees do not purport to adjudicate claims or serve as an admission of guilt and can contain ex-
press disclaimers to the contrary).
13" See Lucille v. City of Chi., 31 F.3d 546, 548-49 (7th Cir. 1994) (refusing to find that an
order incorporated settlement).
132 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1994) (incorpo-
rating terms of settlement into order allows the agreement to be embodied in the court's order);
see also Scelsa v. City Univ. of New York, 76 F.3d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that "[t]he
mere reference in the order to the Agreement does not incorporate the Agreement into the order"
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Secondly, although the court can independently enforce a
consent decree through its contempt power, after an order of dis-
missal the court retains no power to enforce settlement terms con-
tained in the order on its own initiative.13 3 Unless the court explic-
itly retains jurisdiction, the settlement giving rise to the order of
dismissal is merely another contract to be enforced by a plaintiff's
suit, subject to the same jurisdictional problems raised by other
settlements. 34  Consequently, in order for a "functional equiva-
lent" of a consent decree to preserve the stamp of imprimatur re-
quired by Buckhannon, the court should be required to both en-
dorse the terms of the settlement and explicitly retain jurisdiction
over the case.1
35
In addition to the various interpretations of imprimatur, post-
Buckhannon courts have also grappled with interpreting what "ju-
dicial" means in the context of judicial imprimatur. Cases brought
under certain statutes, such as the IDEA, are heard primarily in
administrative forums and rarely see a courtroom.136 Nevertheless,
parties to these hearings and the negotiations surrounding them
often incur attorney fees. Some courts read the requirement of
court involvement to exclude administrative hearings and require
that the case be brought into the judicial forum before attorney
when the terms of the Agreement were not in the order). But see Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d
75, 83 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that court conferred judicial sanction of terms of settlement when
it retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement in its order); Jose Luis R. v. Joliet Township
High Sch. Dist. 204, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13951, at *5 (N.D. I11. Aug. 27, 2001) (reading of
terms into record by administrative officer is enough to confer status in IDEA case).
13 3 See Roberson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2750, at * 14 (explaining that only a consent de-
cree can confer status because it is directly enforceable by the court through the contempt
power); see also Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that a
consent decree is entered by a court which ordinarily has power to enforce its judgments), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 824 (1999); Scottish Air Int'l, Inc. v. British Caledonian Group, PLC, 81 F.3d
1224, 1228, 1230 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Local 40, 76 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding a
court does not have power to enforce an expired order).
134See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22438, at *109-* 111 (D. R.I.
Oct. 18, 2001) (stressing the importance of "continued judicial policing" to a determination that
a party has prevailed). However, some courts maintain that absent a consent decree, even ex-
plicit retention of jurisdiction might not be sufficient to confer status. See Roberson, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2750, at *9 (reading Buckhannon to not allow a settlement to confer status even if
the court retains jurisdiction because this alone does not constitute a "judicial sanctioning" of
the plaintiffs relief).
'35 Reed v. Shenandoah Mem. Hosp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14867, at *10 (D. Neb. Aug.
12, 2002) ("A district court approval of a private settlement along with explicit retention of
jurisdiction to enforce the settlement terms makes a settlement the functional equivalent of a
consent decree, providing the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change of conduct."); see
also Roberson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2750, at *9-*10 (requiring judicial involvement in both
the creation and enforcement of the relief).
'36See Akinseye v. Dist. of Columbia, 193 F. Supp. 2d 134, 139-40 (D.D.C. 2002) (ex-
plaining administrative process under the IDEA), rev'd, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16729 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 12, 2003).
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fees can be shifted. 37  Yet others read the judicial component of
imprimatur more broadly to extend to administrative officers."'
These courts justify this broader reading as necessary in the con-
text of statutes that set up regulatory regimes because requiring
plaintiffs to file a separate action in court to obtain a judicially en-
forceable settlement would be too burdensome. In fact, one court
calls the prospect of obtaining access to a court "impossible" when
settlement occurs at the agency level.
139
While requiring that a court suit be brought might be burden-
some, it can hardly be classified as "impossible" in light of section
1415(i)(2)(A) of the IDEA, which provides "aggrieved" parents
who are unhappy with the administrative process the right to file a
civil claim in either state or federal court, regardless of the amount
in controversy.14  The significance of this provision is two-fold:
First, it demonstrates that Congress envisioned the courts as an
accessible part of the IDEA scheme, and therefore access to them
is not "impossible."' 4 1  Second, and more specifically, it shows
that Congress identified the division of the administrative and ju-
dicial forums, and therefore, it is an impermissible distortion to
interpret the phrase "judicial imprimatur" to envision proceedings
in the separate agency entity. Congress might have just as easily
added, substituted, or supplemented the term "administrative" to
the fee-shifting provision if it so wished, but it did not. Allowing
137 See, e.g., P.O. v. Greenwich Bd. of Educ., 210 F. Supp. 2d 76, 84-85 (D. Conn. 2002)
(reading of settlement terms by administrative officer into record does not equate to a consent
decree in an IDEA case).
131 See L.C. v. Waterbury Bd. of Educ., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6079, at *7-*9 (D. Conn.
Mar. 21, 2002) (holding that a final decision of due process hearing officer is sufficient to allow
a party to prevail because the IDEA provides that attorney fees can be awarded "in any action or
proceeding brought under this section" and the statutory definition of "proceeding" includes
administrative hearings); Jose Luis R. v. Joliet Township High Sch. Dist. 204, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13951, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2001) (allowing plaintiffs in anIDEA proceeding pre-
vailing party status because parties' agreement was read into the administrative record before a
hearing officer). It should be noted that these cases involve the IDEA, a statute that uses fee-
shift language that is arguably differentiable from standard statutory fee-shift language and
explicitly allows that administrative costs can be included in a reasonable assessment of attorney
fees. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(1) (2000) (according right
to counsel at hearings). It is not clear whether the argument for application of judicial imprima-
tur to administrative schemes other than the IDEA's would find support in these precedents.
A court that does allow for administrative officers to serve as bearers of judicial imprima-
tur must still address the issue of whether simply reading the settlement terms into the adminis-
trative record will suffice as the mark of the agency's authority over the plaintiff's relief, or if
the administrative officer must also endorse the terms. See the discussion of this distinction in
section IV(B)(3) of this Note.
'
39Akinseye, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 139.
1- 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2000).
'4' Indeed, it is important to note that parties who choose not to exercise their § 1415(h)
right to a trial are still not without the option of bargaining for attorney fees during the settle-
ment process, which can then be enforced in a court as any other contract.
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administrative officers to be classified as judicial represents an-
other step down the slippery slope of expanding the "prevailing
party" term beyond its intended meaning. As Justice Scalia pre-
dicted in his Buckhannon concurrence, allowing pre-judgment re-
lief 42 to confer prevailing party status opens up an ever-extending
number of avenues to fee shifting that have no logical stopping
point; "[t]here must be a cutoff of seemingly equivalent entitle-
ments to fees."' 14 3 Continuation down this slope would eventually
result in the possibility of a fee shift any time lawyers can be in-
volved in a hearing of any kind, be it before a court or the local
school board.
Another unfortunate effect of allowing fee shifting in the con-
text of administrative hearings might be to "legalize" proceedings
that were formulated to be more informal, flexible, and accessible.
Statutory schemes that feature an administrative proceeding as a
precursor to legal action do so to allow the parties to focus on the
situation before them and to find a cooperative solution that obvi-
ates the need for a court case. Classifying administrative proceed-
ings as judicial hearings in which fees can be shifted simply turns
these hearings into a part of the pretrial process. For example, if
fees can be shifted in IDEA proceedings, parents are more likely to
involve their attorneys in discussions with school officials about
educational plans for their children. Those educators will respond
by involving the school district's attorneys. The sum of this legal
involvement will be a less productive meeting focused more on
legalisms and less on informal collaborative solutions.
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS
A broad reading of Buckhannon prevents the rejection of the
catalyst theory from being a mere technicality. Accordingly, the
reading proffered by this Note is also supported by several policy
arguments that can be applied generally in the argument against
the catalyst theory.
142 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 619-20 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (pointing out that "it would take no more twist-
ing of language to produce prelitigation attorney's fees than to produce... decreeless attorney's
fees").
14 3 Id. at 620. Indeed, this is the same problem that plagued the catalyst theory. Even the
dissent's three-part test to contain and define the parameters of the theory, which is derived
from a test that had been developed in the circuits before Buckhannon, is admittedly not for
"ready administrability." Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992).
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A. Effect on Incentive to Settle
The strongest policy consideration in favor of an exacting in-
terpretation of Buckhannon and a sharp rejection of the catalyst
theory is the effect that any other reading would have on a defen-
dant's incentive to settle, a behavior that is desirable in our legal
system. The possibility that a defendant might still be liable for
attorney fees even when doing what the plaintiff demands acts as a
disincentive to the defendant to voluntarily settle or change behav-
ior, a result which is both unjust and inefficient. If the goal of the
plaintiff's legal action is to effect a change in behavior, the defen-
dant should have the option to do so voluntarily without penalty.
The legal system also prefers private resolution of conflicts where
possible, which is frustrated by the disincentive to settle that re-
sults when the court can interfere to shift fees. The prospect of fee
shifts after settlement therefore encourages prolonged litigation by
punishing a defendant for stopping the lawsuit before judgment.'"
In response to arguments addressing the defendant's incentive
to settle, proponents of the catalyst theory raise concerns of pro-
viding incentive to plaintiffs to bring claims.' 45 The argument,
which is especially strong in the context of civil rights viola-
tions, 146 reasons that if fees might be shifted to defendants that lose
at trial or eventually comply, more meritorious suits will be filed
by plaintiffs who would otherwise not have the means to do so.
However, the connection between encouraging meritorious suits
and shifting fees well short of a final decision on the merits has not
been established empirically; as the majority in Buckhannon points
out, there has been no evidence provided that fewer claims are
brought in jurisdictions such as the Fourth Circuit that have not
been recognizing catalyst theory. 47 Besides, the proper interpreta-
tion of Buckhannon advocated by this Note is not likely to dis-
courage worthy suits; the required ruling on the merits or consent
decree is not likely to be a prohibitive hurdle for a plaintiff with a
meritorious claim. Moreover, the additional possibility of a fee
shift under the catalyst theory is not likely to be determinative in a
decision to bring a meritorious claim; on the contrary, it is more
likely to encourage plaintiffs with frivolous claims to file never-
144 See Buckhannon, 532 U.s at 608-09 (discussing a defendant's willingness to settle
when exposure to liability for attorney's fees remains).
14 5 See id. at 635-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining how, under the catalyst rule, a
plaintiff could accept relief offered by a defendant and still receive attorney fees).
146 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining Congressional desire to provide non-
affluent plaintiffs access to courts to enforce civil rights claims).
147Id. at 608.
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theless in the hopes of forcing the defendant to settle out of con-
venience. 148
Supporters of the catalyst theory in general, and a limited
reading of Buckhannon's rule specifically, also urge that a defen-
dant is not really discouraged from settling, because the allocation
of attorney fees can always be addressed in the settlement agree-
ment itself. Although this is true, awarding plaintiffs the bargain-
ing power of a threatened fee shift if the agreement does not ad-
dress the issue reduces the realistic advantage to the defendant of
entering into a futile attempt to bargain for fees. As liability for
attorney fees can be as expensive as liability for the underlying
claim, 49 this power shift may well be enough to deter a defendant
from considering settlement altogether. Under a regime that al-
lows for fees to be shifted when the plaintiff's relief comes in the
form of a private settlement, the plaintiff with a weak claim has
even less to lose. In such a case, the plaintiff knows that she need
not even bargain for a fee shift if the defendant wishes to avoid
suit, because a fee shift will probably occur anyway because of the
defendant's decision to settle. The plaintiff's increased bargaining
power makes the negotiation of attorney fees more difficult, which
in turn makes settlement a less attractive option for defendants
faced with the prospect of liability for fees above and beyond the
settlement. 1
50
B. Inconsistency with the American Rule and Adversarial System
A limited reading of Buckhannon is also inconsistent with the
American Rule and the nature of America's adversarial system.
The American Rule states that each party pays its own way in an
adversarial system.' 5' If a plaintiff brings suit and gets what it
wants from the suit before judgment, it does not then become the
defendant's responsibility to pay the plaintiff for bringing a claim
against it. Indeed, the operation of the adversarial system and the
tenets of free will that underlie it dictate that the risk be borne by
the plaintiff as the initiator of the suit. Just as the plaintiff bears
the burden to prove the merits of its case, if the court does not is-
sue a final ruling on the merits of the case, the plaintiff bears the
148 See id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing fear that allowing settlements to con-
fer prevailing party status might implicate the law in "exacting the payment of attorney's fees to
the extortionist").
149 Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734 (1986).
'
50 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. i, 7 (1985) ("[M]any a defendant would be unwilling to
make a binding settlement offer on terms that left it exposed to liability for attorney's fees in
whatever amount the court might fix on motion of the plaintiff.").
'5' Gay Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2001).
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burden of convincing the court to issue a consent decree if the
plaintiff wishes to be eligible for a fee shift.
The inconsistency of fee shifting short of a court judgment on
the merits is also demonstrated in the lack of symmetry with re-
spect to the treatment of plaintiffs and defendants. Although most
fee shifting mechanisms use the term "prevailing party" (as op-
posed to "prevailing plaintiff'), both the catalyst theory and a per-
missive reading of Buckhannon operate only to the benefit of
plaintiffs. For example, if a defendant's change in behavior moots
the plaintiff's case and provides the plaintiff with some of the re-
lief sought in the suit, the catalyst theory directs that the plaintiff
has sufficiently prevailed so as to be eligible to have its fees
shifted to the defendant. However, if it is the plaintiffs change in
behavior that moots the suit, for example dropping the suit because
of lack of likely success, the catalyst theory does not allow the de-
fendant, who has been forced to incur fees preparing to defend a
frivolous or spurious claim, to shift those fees to the plaintiff. 52
A reading of Buckhannon that does not allow a private settle-
ment to confer prevailing party status is consistent with the princi-
ple that an adversarial system vests ownership and control of the
dispute in the parties, not the court.153 Without court intervention,
a settlement is a regular private-party negotiation. It would not be
appropriate in a regular negotiation situation for the court to inter-
fere and award negotiation costs to one side. Likewise, unless it
has been called upon to enforce the terms of a settlement or has
ruled on the merits of a claim, it is inappropriate for the court to
award fees when the claim is mooted by the private action of the
parties.
Nor is the likelihood of a defendant holding out on bad faith
to prolong the litigation, only to settle or change the allegedly ob-
jectionable behavior close to the date of trial, a reason to apply the
152 This result is impermissible under statues that by their language "allow defendants as
well as plaintiffs to receive a fee award." Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 620 (Scalia, J., concurring).
153 This emphasis is not present in systems following the European model, which features
an inquisitorial role for the court. See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., The Adversary
System, in ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 120 (1978) (contrasting the adversarial model with
the inquisitorial or interrogative model used in civil law countries). In such a regime, liberal fee
shifts at the discretion of the court would be more appropriate, as it is the court's responsibility
to actively shape the fact-finding that leads to evaluation of the case, whereas judges in an ad-
versarial system only have power to evaluate the information presented by the self-interested
parties.
The control of the parties is such a benchmark of the adversarial system that in some
cases, even after the court renders judgment the parties may disregard the court's treatment of
the case and renegotiate a more satisfactory arrangement. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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catalyst theory and shift fees.1 54 As a threshold matter, it is a de-
fendant's prerogative in an adversarial system to assess the likeli-
hood of its success at trial and to decide to settle. The perceived
prospect of success can change as the trial date draws nearer due
to, for example, new information being uncovered. This argument
also ignores the dynamics of the settlement process, which is pow-
ered partially by the increasing pressure of the impending trial.
Settlement is not likely to continue to be a viable option if fees are
to be shifted to defendants according to how closely the trial date
looms. Moreover, this paper tiger objection to bad-faith prolong-
ing of litigation makes little sense when examined from a tactical
standpoint; as it is holding off, a defendant would be racking up its
own attorney fees, negative publicity, and lost opportunity costs.
As noted above, 55 attorney's fees can sometimes be more expen-
sive than actual liability, making it unlikely that even the most
vindictive defendant would be willing to incur such costs.
At the end of the day, there is no need for the catalyst theory
in an adversarial system that affords plaintiffs a variety of options.
Plaintiffs can convince the court of the need for a consent decree
to enforce the defendant's compliance. There is also the option to
negotiate for fees during settlement; if it is important enough for a
defendant to avoid publicity of trial and accumulation of its own
attorney fees, it will negotiate fees acceptable to the plaintiff. 56 In
order to receive attorney fees and still stay within the letter of a
fee-shifting statute, a plaintiff might also choose to seek damages,
even if nominal.157 If a private settlement is effected, the plaintiff
can always bring suit if the defendant breaches the settlement by
resuming the allegedly offensive behavior, possibly for damages
for both the initial claim's fees and fees for the enforcement ac-
tion. 158
5 It should also be noted that in advancing this argument, the dissent provided no proof
that this is a regular practice of defendants in jurisdictions that did not adopt the catalyst theory.
'- See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
'% This is only an option if the catalyst theory is not in practice. See the discussion of bar-
gaining power in section IV(A) of this Note.
'-7 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 ("We have held that even an award of nominal dam-
ages suffices under [the prevailing party] test."). But see Ciaprazi v. County of Nassau, 195 F.
Supp. 2d 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying fees because they are rarely permitted when nominal
damages are awarded). However, it should be noted that passing the prevailing party test only
means that the judge can consider an appropriate fee award; in the case of nominal damages, a
judge might find that although the plaintiff prevailed, the only appropriate award fees in propor-
tion to his success is no award. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115-16 (1992) (awarding no
attorney fees to prevailing plaintiff who received nominal damages because he could not prove
actual damages).
158 A plaintiff might seek such damages for the fees incurred in bringing the original action
under a quasi-contract theory. The plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's change in behavior
prompted it to drop the initial suit, making the attorney fees incurred in filing the claim detri-
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In sum, the only situation in which a plaintiff would be af-
forded no option to recover under a fee-shifting mechanism would
be when it has not availed itself of any of the above options and it
is clear to the court that either the plaintiff's claim is meritless or
that no further jurisdiction is needed to ensure that the defendant's
behavior does not recur. If a plaintiff's efforts fail in all of these
respects, to order the defendant to pay the plaintiff's attorney fees
would be patently unfair.
C. Separation of Powers and Constitutional Concerns
The doctrine of separation of powers also mandates that the
catalyst theory be abandoned. Even if the goal of fee-shifting stat-
utes is, as the dissent in Buckhannon states, "'to promote the vig-
orous enforcement' of ... civil rights,"'' 59 the means of achieving
that goal are better fleshed out in Congress, not in the courts.
Congress, with its superior fact-finding capabilities, is better able
to assess the need, desirability, and parameters of the catalyst the-
ory as a social policy. 16° Unless Congress specifically provides in
the text of a statute that the catalyst theory may be applied, the
courts should not be in the business of pursuing their own policy
goals. 161
It may even be unconstitutional for judges to award attorney's
fees under the catalyst theory in any situation, even if Congress
does allow for a catalyst fee shift in the relevant statute. Article
III of the Constitution grants jurisdiction over cases and controver-
sies arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, 
61
language which has long been relied upon to limit the function of a
court to deciding the dispute before it. If the parties to a suit pri-
vately settle the case, by definition there is no longer a case or
controversy, and the court's jurisdiction is extinguished. There-
fore, unless it has also ruled on the merits of the case, imposing
attorney fees on an ex-party exceeds the court's constitutional ju-
risdiction. The function of the court and the source of its jurisdic-
tion is dispute resolution; a plaintiff should not be allowed to use
mental losses to the plaintiff.
159 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Christiansburg Gar-
ment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,422 (1978)).
I6WSee Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) ("As an institution,
moreover, Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary to 'amass and evaluate the vast
amounts of data ....') (quoting Walters v. Nat'l Assoc. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,
331 n.12 (1985)).
161 Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 n.13 (1994) ("[T]he efficacy of
an exception to the American Rule is a policy decision that must be made by Congress, not the
courts.").
1
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the court as a remuneration device without first invoking its juris-
diction on the merits of the claim.
This constitutional concern might be countered by looking at
the fee-shifting statute itself as the basis for a new, separate dis-
pute, thus providing the court with a case or controversy on which
to rule. First of all, this argument is only colorable if the fee-
shifting statute explicitly allows for a catalyst fee shift, which
most do not. Furthermore, recent Supreme Court cases indicate
that there is a limit to Congress' power to create new causes of
action, possibly calling into question the very validity of fee-
shifting statutes, which attempt to enlarge the court's jurisdiction
to cover post-dispute claims. 163  At the very least, however, the
Supreme Court has recognized that an action for attorney fees re-
lies on the underlying statutory claim for its viability: "[The] inter-
est in attorney's fees is, of course, insufficient to create an Article
III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the un-
derlying claim. '' 64  A logical conclusion from this relationship
might be that once the claim is mooted by settlement, there is no
Article III standing to support a further claim for attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
In order to give effect to the Court's rejection of the catalyst
theory, Buckhannon must be given a properly expansive reading.
The Court's fidelity to the plain language and intent of fee-shifting
statutes as an exception to the American Rule (and not the rule it-
self) should be observed under all fee-shifting statues that do not
have language explicitly permitting a catalyst fee shift, regardless
of whether the statutory language incorporates the "prevailing
party" term. An appropriate fee shift under such statutes should be
awarded only after the court grants a favorable judgment on the
163 The Court's scrutiny of Congressional power to create new causes of action has cen-
tered largely around the tension between the constitutional requirement of standing and citizen
suit provisions in environmental statutes attempting to grant "any person" the right to sue. See,
e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (setting out three-part test for
standing that must be met regardless of the ESA's statutory language allowing "any person" to
sue). Although the content of these cases and statutes differ from those concerning fee shifting
and the catalyst theory in obvious ways, the underlying problem is similar. In the context of the
standing cases, the Court's objection is with the plaintiff's reduced ability to allege some sort of
injury-in-fact (usually cast as a procedural or informational harm) that would satisfy standing
requirements. See id. at 562-67 (discussing the injury-in-fact requirement). Shifting the attor-
ney fees of plaintiffs under the catalyst theory suffers from the same fatal flaw because such
plaintiffs typically cannot prove damages, or else they would have no need to invoke the cata-
lyst theory as the basis for the requested fee shift. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608-09. Thus,
fee-shifting provisions, especially as utilized under the catalyst theory, essentially grant these
plaintiffs "standing" to seek attorney fees where they otherwise would be ineligible to do so.
164 Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,480 (1990).
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merits to the shiftee or issues a consent decree or other order in-
corporating the terms of the parties' settlement and retaining juris-
diction to enforce them. Interpretations that allow a plaintiff to
claim victory and entitlement to a fee shift after a defendant's vol-
untary change of behavior or a private settlement allow the catalyst
theory to continue in practice and render Buckhannon meaningless.
This losing proposition surely produces no "prevailing party."
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